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Abstract
In this note we prove that any decisiveness index, dened for any voter as the probability
of him/her being decisive, is a semiindex when the probability distribution over coalitions
is anonymous, and it is a semiindex with binomial coecients when the probability over
coalitions is anonymous and independent.
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1 Preliminaries
1.1 Simple game context
Assume that a proposal is put to the vote, that it must be either approved or rejected and that
each voter can only vote \yes" or \no". A model for this binary voting scenario is a simple game
(N;W), where N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng denotes the set of voters and W denotes the set of winning
coalitions. A coalition is any subset S  N , and is interpreted as the set of voters which vote
\yes". A coalition is winning when its occurrence causes the proposal to be accepted. For any
coalition S we denote s = jSj. When the set of voters, N , is xed we will write W instead of
(N;W).
Let SN be the set of simple games on N . A power index on SN is a map  : SN ! Rn that
assigns to every simple game W a vector  (W) with components  i(W) for all i 2 N .
Many power indices have been considered in the literature. Most of them are based on the
notion of cruciality. If W is a simple game, a player i 2 N is said to be crucial for a coalition
S  N n fig if S =2 W but S [ fig 2 W . We then write S 2 Ci(W). This is equivalent to say
that the marginal contribution of player i to S [ fig in W is 1. Intuitively, any measure of power
should take account of the times each player is crucial in a game. Let's recall a family of power
indices of this type, named semiindices. These power indices were rst introduced by Weber [8]
on simple games and extended to all cooperative games by Dubey et al [4].
A semiindex is a power index on SN that satises the well-known axioms of: symmetry, positiv-
ity, dummy player property and transfer. The following characterization of semiindices by means
of coecients was established in Carreras et al. [3], following the characterization given in Dubey
et al. [4]:
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(a) for every p = (p1; : : : ; pn) such that
nP
s=1
ps
 
n 1
s 1

= 1 and ps  0 for all s, the expression
Spi (W) =
X
S2Ci
ps; (1)
where s = jSj, denes a semiindex Sp on SN ;
(b) conversely, every semiindex on SN can be obtained in this way;
c) the correspondence given by fpkg 7! Sp is bijective.
Thus, the payo that a semiindex allocates to every player in any game is a weighted sum of his/her
marginal contributions in the game. Well known examples of semiindices are: the Shapley-Shubik
power index ' (Shapley and Shubik [7]), for which ps = 1=

n
 
n 1
s 1

for any s (1  s  n), and
the Banzhaf power index  (Banzhaf [1] and Penrose [6]) for which ps = 1=2
n 1. The Shapley
and Shubik power index is the only ecient semiindex in the sense that
P
i2N
'i(W) = 1 for every
game W . The Banzhaf power index is the only semiindex having constant coecients. A subclass
of semiindices, that contains the Banzhaf index, is formed by those with binomial coecients:
ps = t
s 1(1  t)n s for some t 2 [0; 1], introduced by Carreras and Freixas [2].
From now on we will denote by Sp the semiindex uniquely dened by the vector p in (1) and
by Bt the particular case of semiindex with binomial coecients:
Bti(W) =
X
S2Ci
ts 1(1  t)n s: (2)
1.2 Simple games with probability distributions over coalitions
A probability distribution over coalitions is a function P : 2N ! R such that P (S)  0 for all
S  N and P
S22N
P (S) = 1. P (S) is interpreted as the probability that voters in S vote \yes" and
voters is N n S vote \no".
Let PN be the set of probability distributions over coalitions on N . For any P 2 PN , a
decisiveness index can be dened on SN , as pointed out by Dubey and Shapley in [5]. The
decisiveness index we are considering captures the idea that voters become crucial for a given
coalition by either changing its status from winning to losing or conversely, and it measures the
probability of a voter being decisive.
Given P 2 PN then, for any voter i 2 N , the decisiveness index is dened as:
Pi (W) =
X
S : i 2 S 2 W
S n fig =2 W
P (S) +
X
S : i =2 S =2 W
S [ fig 2 W
P (S) =
X
S2Ci
[P (S) + P (S n fig)] (3)
The Banzhaf index  and the Shapley-Shubik index ' are examples of decisiveness indices for
particular probability distributions. Indeed,  = P

and ' = P

; where P (S) = 1=2n and
P (S) = 1=

(n+ 1)
 
n
s

for all S  N .
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We center now our attention in anonymous probability distributions.
A probability distribution P is:
i) anonymous if P (S) = P (T ) whenever jSj = jT j,
ii) independent if every voter's vote is independent of the others. In this case, if ti is the
probability of i voting \yes":
P (S) =
Y
i2S
ti
Y
i=2S
(1  ti): (4)
Consequently in an anonymous and independent probability distribution every voter casts the
vote independently of the other voters with the same probability ti = t for all i 2 N so that
P (S) = ts(1  t)n s: (5)
Note that the Banzhaf index is obtained from a probability distribution P  which is both,
anonymous and independent, with ti = 1=2 for all i 2 N . The Shapley-Shubik index is obtained
from the probability distribution P  which is anonymous but not independent.
The purpose of this note is to show that the decisiveness indices P are closely related to
semiindices when the probability distribution P is anonymous and this relation is still greater
when it is anonymous and independent.
2 Decisiveness indices for anonymous probability distributions
Let AN  PN denote the set of anonymous probability distributions. If P 2 AN denote Ps = P (S)
for all S  N . Then the decisiveness index in (3) reduces to
Pi =
X
S2Ci
[Ps + Ps 1] (6)
with
nP
s=0
 
n
s

Ps = 1, Ps  0 for all s = 0; 1; : : : ; n.
Proposition 2.1 Let P 2 AN . Then the decisiveness index P coincides with the semiindex Sp
dened in (1) with coecients ps = Ps + Ps 1 for all s = 1; : : : ; n.
Proof: We have to prove that the vector p = (p1; : : : ; pn) dened by ps = Ps + Ps 1 for all
s = 1; : : : ; n determines a semiindex, i.e., ps  0 for all s = 1; : : : ; n and
nP
s=1
 
n 1
s 1

ps = 1. Then,
from (1) and (6), we deduce that P = Sp.
It is clear that ps  0 for s = 1; : : : ; n because Ps  0 for all s = 0; 1; : : : ; n.
Using that
nP
s=0
 
n
s

Ps = 1 we deduce that
nP
s=1
 
n 1
s 1

ps = 1 as follows:
3
nP
s=0
 
n
s

Ps = 1 () P0 +
n 1P
s=1
 
n
s

Ps + Pn = 1
() P0 +
n 1P
s=1
 
n 1
s 1

+
 
n 1
s

Ps + Pn = 1 () P0 +
n 1P
s=1
 
n 1
s 1

Ps +
nP
s=2
 
n 1
s 1

Ps 1 + Pn = 1
() (P0 + P1) +
n 1P
s=2
 
n 1
s 1

Ps +
n 1P
s=2
 
n 1
s 1

Ps 1 + (Pn 1 + Pn) = 1 ()
nP
s=1
 
n 1
s 1

(Ps + Ps 1) = 1
()
nP
s=1
 
n 1
s 1

ps = 1

Nevertheless, not every semiindex comes from a decisiveness index. As an example consider
for n = 3 the semiindex Sp dened by p = (p0; p1; p2) = (1=8; 3=8; 1=8). In fact, if there were
P 2 AN satisfying the three equalities in Proposition 2.1 then it should be P1  1=8 and P2  1=8
from the rst and third equalities, which would contradict the second equality P1+P2 = 3=8. The
characterization of the semiindices which come from a decisiveness index is an open problem.
A direct consequence of Proposition 2.1 is the following corollary, which establishes a bijective
correspondence between the semiindices with binomial coecients dened in (2) and the decisive-
ness indices given by anonymous and independent probability distributions. Let IN  AN denote
the set of anonymous and independent probability distributions.
Corollary 2.2 If P 2 IN then P = Bt for some t 2 [0; 1], and, conversely, any semiindex Bt
can be obtained in this way.
Proof: From (5), if P 2 IN then there exist some t 2 [0; 1] such that Ps = ts(1   t)n s, for
s = 0; 1; : : : ; n. From Proposition 2.1 we know that P = Sp with the vector p = (p1; : : : ; pn)
dened by ps = Ps + Ps 1 for all s = 1; : : : ; n. Thus, ps = ts(1   t)n s + ts 1(1   t)n s+1 =
ts 1(1   t)n s[t + (1   t)] = ts 1(1   t)n s, and these coecients dene the semiindex Bt. As
this proof is independent of t we can conclude that any semiindex with binomial coecients is a
decisiveness index P with P 2 IN . 
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